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Abstract 
This paper develops a model of legislative spending in which revenues can be spent through earmarks or a general 
fund. Legislative choice is modeled as a Baron and Ferejohn style legislative bargaining game. The novel approach is 
to model the bargaining process as a two-stage game reflecting the reality that earmarked expenditures precede general 
fund appropriations. This drives the result that all revenue is spent by way of earmarking leaving no revenue in the 
general fund.
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1. Introduction
Earmarking has recently become a popular buzz word in the political press usually
referring to some form of pork barrel spending. Throughout this paper I will refer to the
traditional public nance denition of earmarking: the dedication of a specic revenue
(tax) to a specic purpose. This denition highlights a fundamental feature of earmarking:
earmarked revenues are diverted into dedicated accounts that circumvent the usual
legislative appropriations process whereby revenues go into a general fund and are then
distributed. Thus, earmarking expenditure decisions must precede general fund
expenditure decisions. This note develops a model of earmarking in a legislative bargaining
game in the style of Baron and Ferejohn (1989) whereby earmarking decisions precede
general fund spending decisions.
Earmarking has long been discussed in the public nance literature yet its treatment has
been far from exhaustive. The classic paper in this literature is Buchanan (1963).
Buchanan uses a median voter approach to public decision making to analyze how the
dierent institutions of earmarking or general fund nancing inuence public spending.
This approach is continued with the papers of Browning (1975), Goetz (1968), and Goetz
and McKnew (1972) and more recently by Athanassakos (1990).
The most recent earmarking research takes a game theoretic approach. Dhillon and Perroni
(2001) and B os (2000) take an information economics approach to earmarking. Leblanc,
Snyder and Tripathi (2000) briey address earmarking inside a bargaining model of public
investment. Brett and Keen (2000) present a model of earmarking in the context of a
signalling game. Jackson (2011) presents a model of earmarking based on partisan politics
and separation of powers reminiscent of the policy insulation literature(Moe (1989), Moe
(1990), Moe (1991), Figueiredo (2002), and Figueiredo (2003)). Anesi (2006) develops a
two period model of earmarking with endogenous elections whereby incumbents can use
earmarking as a means to commit themselves to a less preferred policy in order to gain
electoral advantage. See Jackson (2011) for a detailed review of the earmarking literature.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model with section 3 giving the
main results. The paper concludes in section 4. All proofs are relegated to the appendix.
2. The Model
A legislature with 3 members must decide how to spend a given amount of tax revenue.
Tax revenue is given exogenously and is denoted by R. I refer to a generic legislator as
legislator i and it is often convenient to refer to legislators other than i as j or k. Revenue
can be spent on distribution to each legislator's district and on a public good. Let xi
denote the amount of distribution made to legislator i's district. Spending on the public
good is denoted by xy. Production of the public good is represented by a constant returns
to scale cost function with constant K so that when spending on the public good is xy the
level of public good provision is y =
xy
K . Spending levels are determined in a two stage
bargaining game with stage one being the earmarking stage and the second stage being the
general fund stage.
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Each legislator has preferences given by a utility function which depends on the quantity of
funds distributed to a legislator's district and level of public good provision. To keep the
model simple all legislators have identical preferences regarding public good provision.
Legislators disagree, however, when it comes to spending directed at legislator's individual
districts. Utility takes a quasilinear form as given in (1) below.
Ui(xi;y) = xi + Bln(y) (1)
In the earmarking stage, one legislator is randomly selected (with equal probability on
each) to make an earmarking proposal. This proposal contains a proposed amount of
distribution to each legislator's district and a spending proposal for the public good.
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The proposal, xie, is voted on using majority rule against a status quo, denoted q, which
must be feasible itself. Denote the realization, after voting, in the earmarking stage by xe;
if i's proposal is passed then xe = xie and if the proposal is not passed then xe = q. At the
earmarking stage, proposal and vote decisions are made by evaluating expected utility.
In the general fund stage one legislator is randomly recognized to make a general fund
proposal. This is a proposal on how to spend any revenue left over after the earmarking








. This proposal is feasible if all proposed
expenditures are positive and expenditure doesn't exceed revenue available. The general
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This proposal is voted on against the status quo that all general fund revenue is spent on
the public good. Denote the realization, after voting, in the general fund stage by xgf.










A strategy consists of: an earmarking proposal plan, xie(q)  R4; A general fund proposal
plan, xi(xe)  R4; probability distributions that determine which player is bought o to be
a part of a majority coalition; voting rules over earmarking and general fund proposals.
The set Mgf(xi(xe)) species the set of all legislators who vote to pass general fund
proposal xi(xe) and the set M(xie(q)) denotes all legislators who vote to pass earmarking
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proposal xie(q). The equilibrium concept employed is the standard subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium.
It is easy to verify that many unrealistic equilibria will exist under the assumption of simple
Nash voting behavior. For example, it is an equilibrium for each legislator to take a voting
strategy in which all proposals are voted against. I wish to rule out this type of unrealistic
Nash voting behavior and do so by imposing the assumption of weak dominance in voting
strategies throughout. Voting strategies satisfy weak dominance when a legislator votes to
pass any proposal that gives her at least as much (expected) utility as not passing the
proposal. It is obvious that weakly dominant voting strategies are Nash voting strategies.1
3. Results
I begin by identifying optimal general fund proposal strategies which must be a solution to



















a): xi(xe) 2 Xgf(xe)





It is clear from the objective function that any solution will have to spend all available
revenue; constraint a) will be binding. Likewise, it is optimal to induce a minimally sized
coalition to vote for the proposal and it is optimal to do so in a minimal way so that the
chosen coalition memeber j 2 M(xi(xe)) will be indierent between passing the proposal or
not. Legislator i is entirely indierent to which legislator she will buy o; they are equally
costly to buy o in the general fund stage. Thus, I let legislator i assign a probability of
one half to each legislator to be chosen to maintain symmetry. The following equations
describe the optimal general fund proposal strategies referred to in proposition 1 below.
The sets X1, X2, X3, and X4 cover X and are dened in the appendix.
1The sets Mgf(xi(xe)) and M(xie(q)) are written formally in the appendix under the assumption weakly
dominant voting.
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if xe 2 X1
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y if xe 2 X2 S
X4
0 if xe 2 X3
(8)








dened by equations 5, 6, 7, and
8 form optimal general fund proposals.
In a subgame perfect equilibrium the legislator chosen to make a proposal will take general
fund proposals from proposition 1 as given and choose an earmarking proposal to maximize












i (q) + x
j
i (x
ie(q)) + B ln

xie






a): xie(q) 2 X
b): i 2 M(xie(q))
c): jM(xie(q))j  2:
It is not immediately apparent that a solution to the earmarking constrained optimization
problem will spend all revenue. Theorem 1 demonstrates that if a solution exists that does
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not earmark all revenue then there must be another solution in which all revenues are
earmarked leaving no money on the table to be spent in the general fund stage of the game.
Theorem 1. If a solution to the earmarking constrained optimization problem exists, then
there is always a solution in which all revenue is earmarked.
4. Conclusion
I develop a legislative bargaining model in which public spending is accomplished via
earmarking to the neglect of a general fund. The fact that earmarking decisions must
precede general fund decisions is what makes earmarks appealing. To not earmark is to
give up the opportunity to secure ones place in a winning coalition. The recognized
legislator must compensate another for the forgone opportunity to make a proposal in the
general fund stage thus securing majority support for the earmarked proposal. However,
there is no requirement in the model that an earmarking proposal spend all revenue. It is
possible to buy votes to pass an earmarking proposal by either earmarking revenue to
coalition members or by leaving unspent revenue to be allocated in the general fund stage
of the game. This feature of the model constitutes a signicant deviation from the
traditional bargaining literature (Baron and Ferejohn (1989), Rubinstein (1982)) which
requires proposals to allocate the entire economic pie and bargaining coming to an end
with an accepted proposal.
This analysis suggests that when the institutions of legislative decision making allow
earmarking to occur, it will be done. This is not consistent with the available data on
earmarking. Though some US states earmark large portions of their revenue, none earmark
it all. This is likely due to frictions that prevent such behavior from occurring as may arise
from partisan politics or the separation of powers among branches of government as argued
by Jackson (2011) but are absent in the model of this paper. Future work on earmarking
should incorporate a richer political structure and address the dynamic implications of
earmarking.
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The sets Mgf(xi(xe)) and M(xie(q)) can be written formally as below for voting strategies





















































































A.2 Optimal GF Proposal Strategy





    
2B  xy and R  
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The sets X1, X2, X3, and X4 have been constructed to cover the space X;
S4
i=1 Xi = X.
A.3 Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. The proof is broken into four parts; each reecting a dierent
location of the earmarking outcome xe 2 X.
1. Let xe 2 X1.
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The utility to j from rejecting the proposal is
x
e































Legislator i's optimal spending on the public good can be characterized as the
solution to an unconstrained concave optimization problem maximizing i's utility
































The solution to this problem is xi
y (xe) = 2B   xe
y. Substitution directly implies that












































These are proposals are consistent with equations 1-4. By construction we know that
j will vote to pass the proposal. To show that this is the optimal proposal two more
conditions must be demonstrated; the proposal must be feasible and individually
rational for i. It is trivial to show that the proposal is feasible.






















This is true by the assumption that xe 2 X1.
2. Let xe 2 X2.
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In this case, the proposal derived in part 1 above is still an optimal proposal.
However, this proposal yields the proposer the same utility as the status quo.
























Further suppose that a feasible proposal, ^ xi(xe), exists which gives the proposer, i,
more utility than the status quo and j at least as much utility as the status quo.




































































Notice that when ^ xi
y(xe) = 2B   xe
y combined with the assumption that xe 2 X2,
equation (10) cannot hold. The proof proceeds by showing that there is no feasible
^ xi
y(xe) that satises equation (10). This contradiction then implies that no feasible
proposal can be passed which oers the proposer more utility than the status quo.
Dierentiate both sides of equation (10) with respect to ^ xi
y(xe). The derivative of the





y(xe) = 2B   xe
y the derivative of the left hand side is equal to one and when
^ xi
y(xe) > 2B   xe
y the derivative of the l.h.s. is positive but less than one. Increasing
^ xi
y(xe) from ^ xi
y(xe) = 2B   xe
y will increase the lhs of equation (10) at a slower rate
than the rhs increases. Thus, there is no ^ xi
y(xe) > 2B   xe
y that can satisfy equation
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(10).
Now consider 0  ^ xi
y(xe) < 2B   xe
y. Note that the derivative of the l.h.s. of equation
(10) is greater than one. Decreasing ^ xi
y(xe) from ^ xi
y(xe) = 2B   xe
y will decrease the
lhs of equation (10) at a faster rate than the rhs will decrease. Thus, there is no
^ xi
y(xe) with 0  ^ xi
y(xe) < 2B   xe
y that can satisfy equation (10).
With no ^ xi
y(xe) feasible that can satisfy equation (10), then there is no feasible
proposal that can be passed by a majority that gives more utility to the proposer
than the status quo. The the optimal proposal is the status quo of spending all
revenue on the public good.
3. Let xe 2 X3. The utility of the proposer as a function of xi
y(xe) can be written as
follows
xe


































y(xe)   1 .
The sign of marginal utility at xi
y(xe) = 0 is less than or equal to zero because
xe
y  2B. Therefore, the optimal feasible level of public good spending for i to
propose is zero, xi
y (xe) = 0.

















































It is trivial to show that this proposal is feasible. The proposal was constructed in a
way that legislator j will vote to pass the proposal. It remains to verify that this






































This holds because xe 2 X3.
4. Let xe 2 X4. Suppose that there exists a feasible proposal, ^ xi(xe), such that the
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proposer gets strictly more utility than with the status quo and legislator j gets at
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I now show that there is no feasible ^ xi
y(xe) which satises equation (11).
When ^ xi
y(xe) = 0 both sides of equation (11) are zero; the equation cannot be
satised. All possible solutions require that ^ xi
y(xe) > 0. Dierentiate both sides of
equation (11) with respect to ^ xi
y(xe). The derivative of the r.h.s is one and the




y  2B it follows that the derivative of
the l.h.s is less than one. Therefore, when increasing ^ xi
y(xe) from zero, the left hand
side of equation (11) increases more slowly than does the right hand side. Hence,
there is no feasible ^ xi
y(xe) which satises equation (11). Thus, when xe 2 X4 it is
optimal for the proposer to propose the status quo of all revenue being spent on the
public good.
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Let ^ xie(q) be a solution to the earmarking constrained optimization problem. Then
EUi(^ x











ie(q)) + B ln
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^ xie








l (q) + ^ xie
y (q) < R.
Let  = R  
 P3
l=1 ^ xie
l (q) + ^ xie
y (q)
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i (q) + B ln

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Because ^ xie(q) 2 X2 S
X4 all general fund proposals (following a passage of ^ xie(q)) will
spend all left over revenue () on the public good. Therefore EUi (xie(q)) = EUi (^ xie(q)).
It is simple to conrm that xie(q) will pass under majority rule; this is omitted for brevity.
Therefore xie(q) is also a solution to the constrained optimization problem when
^ xie(q) 2 X2 S
X4. It is trivial to show that xie(q) spends all revenue in the earmarking
stage.
Now suppose ^ xie(q) is a solution to the earmarking constrained optimization problem and
^ xie(q) 2 X1 with
P3
l=1 ^ xie
l (q) + ^ xie














i (q) + p
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Equation (12) is continuous in  and holds at  = 0 because ^ xie(q) 2 X1. Therefore, 9  
such that R  
 P3
l=1 ^ xie
l (q) + ^ xie
y (q)

>   > 0 and letting  =  , equation (12) still holds;
that is xie(q) 2 X1.
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Let  =  . Then the expected utility to the proposer from proposal xie(q) can be written as
EUi(x
ie(q)) = ^ x
ie
















and the expected utility to the proposer from proposal ^ xie(q) can be written as
EUi(^ x



















Because  > 0 and p > 1
3 it follows that EUi(xie(q)) > EUi(^ xie(q)). It remains to be shown
that j prefers such a proposal as well. Do a similar calculation for j
EUj(x
ie(q)) = ^ x
ie




































so that EUj(xie(q)) > EUj(^ xie(q)) because p < 2
3.
Hence, we have found a feasible proposal that both i and j strictly prefer to ^ xie(q). This
provides a contradiction to ^ xie(q) being a solution to the constrained optimization problem.
Thus any solution to the earmarking constrained optimization problem with xie(q) 2 X1
must earmark all revenue.
Lastly, suppose ^ xie(q) is a solution to the earmarking constrained optimization problem
and ^ xie(q) 2 X3 with
P3
l=1 ^ xie
l (q) + ^ xie
y (q) < R. Construct xie(q) as was previously done
when xie(q) 2 X1 but with  = R  
 P3
l=1 ^ xie












ie(q)) = ^ x
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So that EUi(xie(q)) > EUi(^ xie(q)) because p > 1
3. It remains to show that j prefers such a
proposal as well.
EUj(x
ie(q)) = ^ x
ie
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and
EUj(^ x











so that EUj(xie(q)) > EUj(^ xie(q)) because p < 2
3.
Hence, we have found a feasible proposal that both i and j strictly prefer to ^ xie(q). This
provides a contradiction to ^ xie(q) being a solution to the earmarking constrained
optimization problem. Any solution with xie(q) 2 X3 must earmark all revenue.
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